Insights

The “Verification Sign” NFT Drainer: One Operator, 528 Wallets, 200+ Exchange Tags

An on-chain investigation into a single XRPL NFT-phishing operator who mints fake “Verification Sign” and “Ownership Verification” NFTs, drains the wallets that interact with them, and rotates to a brand-new minting wallet every one to two days to dodge content filters. Here is the full money trail — every wallet, transaction hash and exchange destination tag you can verify yourself.

On-chain snapshot · measured 2026-06-16 · every figure reproducible from public ledger data

Tip: click any blue address or transaction hash to open it in xrpl.to, Bithomp, or XRPScan.

Part of the live XRPL NFT Scam Tracker — this article is the deep dive on one operator behind that campaign.

Wallets, one operator
528
activation-linked tree
Scam NFTs flagged
12,487
flagged & hidden
Exchange deposits
16
200+ destination tags
Funding fingerprint
333 XRP
per rotated wallet
Status

This operator's NFTs and collections are flagged and hidden from XRPL.to.

Every wallet, collection and offer documented here is marked as a scam and removed from XRPL.to listings and search, and new wallets in the same cluster are caught as they appear. We deliberately do not publish how that is done — that detail stays internal so the operator cannot adapt around it.

fundsfunds333 XRPKrakenrnJrjec2…exchange · boundaryAnchorrsrroeS4…first operator walletTreasuryrD9sevU…0 NFTs · apex40+ minting walletsone new wallet / ~24–36 h● = active wallet (rhQ63…)every wallet seeded with exactly 333 XRP — a unique, repeated funding fingerprint
The funding chain. The operator withdrew from one exchange (Kraken) into a first wallet, then ran a 40-plus generation ‘daisy chain’: each wallet is seeded with exactly 333 XRP, mints ~100 phishing NFTs, drains victims, then funds the next wallet and goes dormant.

The findings, one layer at a time

Tap any section to expand the on-chain evidence.

The operator mints NFTs named “Verification Sign #NNNN” and “Ownership Verification” — there is no image or website, the name itself is the social-engineering hook. The victim is pushed an NFTokenCreateOffer with a memo themed around “verification”. Their wallet shows a reassuring “verify” prompt, but signing it actually accepts a sell offer that sweeps their XRP or tokens.

The active wallet at the time of writing, , minted 111 such NFTs and drained 8 wallets of ~23,915 XRP (plus seven token-denominated drains) in about 37 hours before going quiet — the textbook lifecycle of one rotation.

Key addresses & the activation chain

Funding exchange · "Kraken"
44.3M XRP balance · funds 35,417 ordinary accounts · the operator withdrew from here
First operator wallet (anchor)
activated by the exchange · 10 children
Pass-through
1 child → the treasury
Treasury / apex
mints 0 NFTs (never appears in the scam NFTs) · activated 20 children
40+ generation 333-XRP daisy chain
one disposable minting wallet per ~24–36 h, each a confirmed scam issuer
— 40+ wallets, all seeded with 333 XRP —
Parent of the active wallet
minted 59 NFTs, 44 flagged
Active scammer (rotated 2026-06-14)
111 NFTs minted · drained 8 wallets in ~37 h

Methodology: the cluster in this report was traced from public XRP-Ledger account-activation records; drains were read from the XRPL.to NFT trade index; the cash-out trail was followed via full-history nodes (s1/s2.ripple.com) account_tx, with XRP amounts taken from delivered_amount. Routed-flow magnitudes are gross (layering inflates them) and approximate; all addresses, transaction hashes and destination tags are exact. This article analyses publicly visible on-chain activity and wallet behaviour; it does not assert the legal identity of any person. Figures are a snapshot as of 2026-06-16 and may drift as the operator continues to rotate.