Insights

XRPL Payment Drain Tracker

Live · updated 0s ago

A live, on-chain record of the “Safe XRPL verify message” payment drain on the XRP Ledger. In a scam similar to the Xaman/XPMarket NFT phishing, victims are tricked into signing a Payment — not handing over a seed — that sweeps their XRP and tokens to attacker-controlled wallets. We flag the destination wallets the instant a drain lands, so wallets and dapps can block them before the next victim signs.

Think you’re being drained right now?

Don’t panic. Nothing leaves your wallet unless you sign — simply connecting, or the request spam by itself, cannot move your funds. If you’re not sure what to do, close the app or tab and ask for help before signing anything.

  1. Do not sign any “verification” transaction. No legitimate wallet check requires you to sign a Payment.
  2. Move remaining funds to a fresh wallet you create offline; assume the connected wallet is compromised.
  3. Revoke the malicious app’s access in your wallet (per-wallet steps are under each demo below) and never re-import your seed into a site.
  4. Check a counterparty before signing: GET https://api.xrpl.to/v1/scams/check/<address>.
XRP swept
4.83M
+ tokens below
Drainer wallets
207
all blocklisted
Victims
4.7K
Drain payments
11.3K
First seen
2026-03-03
Latest drain
6h ago

Attack flow at a glance

1Lure

A fake "verification", airdrop, or poll on a Xaman / XPMarket lookalike.

2Connect

Wallet connects so the site can scan balances. No funds move yet.

3Sign "verify"

The prompt is really a Payment whose Destination is the attacker.

4Swept

One signature sends the victim's XRP and tokens to the attacker.

Connecting is harmless on its own — the loss happens only at step 3, the instant a Payment is signed.

How victims get baited

The drain only works once you’re on the attacker’s page. Like the similar XRPL NFT offer-spam scam, it runs several lures in parallel — almost always wrapped in urgency (“verify in 10 minutes”, “limited slots”):

Circulating now · fake
“Community Day Is Live. Monthly XRP Release. 10% Back to Holders.”

There is no “Community Day”, no “Monthly XRP Release”, and no “10% back to holders” program — none of this exists. It is just the current wrapper on the same sign-to-drain Payment.

  • X / Twitter replies. Fake “Xaman support” / project-admin accounts, padded with bot followers, reply in trending XRPL threads with “verification” links.
  • Brand impersonation. Mostly Xaman (“your wallet needs verification”, fake “Xaman Community Day”), plus spotlight tokens like PHNIX or FuzzyBear.
  • Telegram & Discord DMs. A “support agent” or “moderator” DMs you after you post in a channel, then funnels you to the bait link.
  • “Exclusive group” bait. An invite to a whale / OG-holders room gated behind a “membership verification” — the same sign-to-drain trap.
  • Google search hijacking. Typo-squatted domains and paid “Sponsored” ad slots sitting above the real result for wallet / marketplace searches.

These lures mirror a similar scam’s playbook — full breakdown there: XRPL NFT Scam Tracker → How victims are lured in.

How the verification-sign drain works

It is a server-driven signature drainer: the attacker’s backend authors the transaction and the victim signs it in their own wallet on a lookalike like poll-xaman.app. The seed is never typed or collected — so the “never share your seed” warnings never fire.

What the victim actually signs — the friendly “Safe XRPL verify message” prompt at step 3 above — is a Payment whose Destination is the attacker’s wallet. There is no “verification” transaction type on the XRP Ledger; the word is purely cosmetic dressing on a transfer.

The takeaway: no legitimate wallet check ever asks you to sign a Payment. If a “verification” produces a transaction to sign, it is a drain.

Watch the drain — by wallet

Real recordings of the same drain across three wallets. Each shows the identical move: a friendly “verification” prompt that is actually a Payment to the attacker’s wallet.

Crossmarkbrowser extension
Stop it: Just close the tab — the request spam stops. There is no trusted-app entry to remove.
GemWalletbrowser extension
Stop it: Close the tab signed into the attacker, then GemWallet → Settings → Trusted apps → remove it.
Xamanmobile app

What you’re watching

  1. Step 1

    The site pushes a sign request into Xaman, framed as a routine “verification”.

  2. Step 2

    The payload is actually a Payment whose Destination is the attacker’s wallet.

  3. Step 3

    Each approval drains one asset — the highest remaining balance by value first. Declining does nothing, so the attacker re-pushes the next-highest on a loop — the payment-request spam.

Stop it: Xaman → Settings → Third-party apps → remove the app to stop the spam.

Recent drains (live)

Every confirmed drain, newest first — flagged the moment it lands on the ledger.

WhenVictimDrainerSweptTx
6h agorUAQrMY…bvrWrL12Ytz…qdUm2.1K XRP206FE7F9
9h agornkjnk7…bBjrrhBSQMm…S2Fw5.9K XRP9C17995B
11h agorMAXyCm…RYr6rKupehy…Sup1397 XRPA16FF88E
12h agorEpCdPA…nqX9rnWBveb…fdp5173 XRP7B11D016
12h agorB91EFR…sT22rnWBveb…fdp51.8K XRP2633C72C
14h agorHus65o…f2C8rBDsymm…q5oS80 XRPEC420BF8
15h agorDV1G2K…qAUnrBDsymm…q5oS317 XRP368E02FC
19h agor9qnoD3…6QQNrLBpP3x…Ctcb9.0K XRPD9D11126
22h agorHyVDeF…JUFZr4i2GL9…nqRj132 XRP5EF1931B
22h agorBFqy7N…8oHZrL12Ytz…qdUm840 XRPFCF80A7F
22h agorGiZG6w…DGzqrHbvKN7…1Xgr7.5K XRP87CB5AE8
23h agorB8n2AS…KvL2rKupehy…Sup1112 XRP46A75F2F
23h agorHQMDzc…1D54rLBpP3x…Ctcb368 XRPF3510980
1d agorEdYj2A…8YwxrKupehy…Sup1156 XRP5F73DE7F
1d agorwauw6G…p8qQrKupehy…Sup179 XRPAFDB1683
1d agorEdYj2A…8YwxrKupehy…Sup1300 XRP528E31E3
1d agorLrZLae…L6dDrKupehy…Sup170 XRP331A17AA
1d agorPq6YTS…X8VRrGESzBJ…zk6C108 XRP5A38BEF2
1d agorJJBoKz…Z1zfrQB8jTu…YTNa11.4K XRP12B3FBF5
1d agoraMcbyr…Kd4nr4i2GL9…nqRj105 XRPAD13F0BA
2d agor4hBvhg…uEohrhRGZz7…Pmw5138 XRP0496B12F
2d agorWpHW16…27LgrGGXaBd…xHVB0 XRP7CBEA3D5
2d agorGRnrwe…9skurGGXaBd…xHVB0 XRPE526A8B1
2d agorsfzd77…LvcMr4z4nhF…suwn90 XRP158CB3E4
2d agor37euLE…zqScrLBpP3x…Ctcb7.9K XRP3680C101
2d agorE2RQcp…zr5arLBpP3x…Ctcb1.5K XRPFA09449C
2d agorGY8YGi…8UczrLBpP3x…Ctcb7.5K XRP30451C23
2d agorhHVXRV…ShjFrHbvKN7…1Xgr8.7K XRP3F0E103B
2d agor9rYRYz…kCWJrNVBzLK…SrkS53 XRP3A958760
2d agorWnSjru…WjVorHbvKN7…1Xgr17.4K XRP42FDDEAC
2d agorHugYLx…5a7orHbvKN7…1Xgr17.4K XRP9F45D989
2d agorhAg5ms…MtfSrHbvKN7…1Xgr8.7K XRP1FA3FB2A
2d agorsPeCbo…7PkprpdjrXX…rrdr1.8K XRPA74E8910
2d agorwzjF1t…XMYYraztM2N…SoxR921 XRPE8285E1C
2d agorwzjF1t…XMYYraztM2N…SoxR879 XRP383FA64D
2d agorwNKE1T…HQoArHaNGox…SXi5138 XRP5AC44186
3d agorptUaNs…GXjWr4Az2BE…mmRh37.9K XRP80E4DA69
3d agorEPak6n…9MzErGGXaBd…xHVB0 XRP9A2CF581
3d agorynxJZR…44forGGXaBd…xHVB0 XRP46125BDC
3d agorynxJZR…44forGGXaBd…xHVB0 XRPEB1ED8A7
3d agorynxJZR…44forGGXaBd…xHVB0 XRP65747BB1
3d agorf7QoGc…cLnirGGXaBd…xHVB0 XRP4A6174F4
3d agor3CUuqX…esWfrGGXaBd…xHVB0 XRP7662D124
3d agorBadHTP…TC9orGGXaBd…xHVB0 XRP8DE642AF
3d agornXZ876…TX5arGGXaBd…xHVB0 XRPA105E5BD
3d agor4D1Jmz…SDhvrGGXaBd…xHVB0 XRP49EF25A3
3d agorDQSFBV…hvFzrGGXaBd…xHVB0 XRPD4D2C7B3
3d agorNzocJ9…F7rYrGGXaBd…xHVB0 XRP9F7BF677
3d agorhVGXf3…wwUBrGGXaBd…xHVB0 XRP85D25813
3d agorBadHTP…TC9orGGXaBd…xHVB0 XRP9A0AAE00

Drainer wallets

Every destination below is a confirmed drainer wallet on our free, published blocklist. Do not send to, or sign any offer/payment involving, these addresses.

Drainer walletXRPDrains
rGGXaBd…xHVB267.7K10279
r9Mri3y…G7aw108.1K72
rnaBRmX…rhA9570.1K64
rg24swj…EP8d244.0K52
rMfaR9y…9Mtq249.7K52
rpKqbVp…G8ba235.5K47
r3jV8g5…YFXt219.6K39
rB5Svdr…JuVm277.4K38
rLBpP3x…Ctcb113.7K32
rMeex5L…6yXz64.7K31
rL12Ytz…qdUm36.2K25
rMC88RE…ki8U4.5K22
rGwyEpN…6AnG130.1K21
rwxD9Hf…7eSN10.0K20
raztM2N…SoxR30.1K18
rf3v2WV…HEez177.2K15
rhBSQMm…S2Fw77.7K14
rDWqqUr…Aqjw53.4K14
rGX8gZR…rDXy4.0K13
rnbLHZR…yxiG11.2K12
r4i2GL9…nqRj2.0K11
rhT1f6R…7CgZ61.9K10
rpLdWEV…w6BX27.3K10
r93c8e1…aAbw1.0K10
rQB8jTu…YTNa53.4K9
rLt1wC6…xVx14.8K9
rBDsymm…q5oS1.1K7
r4eJwSQ…DeQY8867
rLLGxpr…C2tD8547
rPi1eYr…D9Th8867
rwP4vSe…ctrn4226
rGF9n5W…qPQT7.6K6
rNCNqRD…t9N31.1K6
rNeU6ZV…aVmd1.9K6
rpAefdF…6Bsf19.8K6
rMuEzHB…A7aq2.3K6
rKupehy…Sup11.1K6
rNVdQM2…bmH314.7K5
rG1be8K…A7MZ5.1K5
rwvt8vZ…h41w5325
rBoHWiV…aisx7165
rLVaJ3o…AZMf6205
r3jjsSE…KXdj25.8K5
rhRGZz7…Pmw53.2K5
rHaNGox…SXi56965
rHbvKN7…1Xgr59.8K5
r46t1LR…qDRz2.3K4
rLoVYVN…GkVF953
rsUWvBx…Vv6n163.9K3
rLvNaJK…ZjaA17.6K3
rKUxgZt…c3QW3.6K3
rDQRB57…Xr1r4.6K3
rwr46AV…CTd91.6K3
rhAhm3N…kyin1513
rfJ7pbk…1Qm27.4K3
rPVrW6f…7xFZ3763
r42hXZx…SVrB129.0K3
rnbA5up…2PMa3853
rwh29Jw…Ev2o1.3K3
rDZwitD…t6hQ4.6K3
rLmas1L…UWht10.1K3
rNVBzLK…SrkS3313
r7f6f83…i1gj105.6K3
rs2nDSC…XoSW7103
rhBgCpn…iDzC5.8K3
rpYHhEU…KwBM2.1K3
rNRgKY9…MMgT222
rfegXyR…DW6b3552
rJQUq96…xJcA2.9K2
rKaJzXD…DAPs47.7K2
rUiMrDp…fqw52.9K2
rKMrRk7…5rzH63.2K2
rDWdXPm…u7Gm1952
rDr99dd…b4v43762
rPkrVEZ…7ipi1802
rpNDscP…xQAw8452
rG892BD…TJ5u1692
rhbdcpu…5yVv9842
rpJfQwp…BrEG8092
rExKmtC…yHVE1512
rNQPMco…3DSM2.0K2
rfCtDFf…QERg125.0K2
rUPJ6wh…md4n3.0K2
rabY1Qb…SsjR2.4K2
rMxtFEG…gd51147.4K2
rGdVs7f…QxSg2452
rGKzaB2…Fr6U4.8K2
rUu5RKX…Lmxk2712
rEji9ax…q5y913.4K2
rsSh8bC…BodM87.0K2
rfVJRqx…fD6p1.8K2
rGXv4xc…xYfe3.1K2
r3K6RjN…p5y31.5K2
r71qCHa…BNTt2.5K2
rBQ6MN9…WGRJ3012
rpPepCB…bbnD9802
rGESzBJ…zk6C2.5K2
rnWBveb…fdp51.9K2
r38ypQ8…tSNy101
r37toWB…qVew3191
rMMdkUj…cxPL01
rfj1LJz…8V7m81
rGmTMJu…DntH31
rLb9SmC…NBqb4991
rhSNExU…kcY14971
rfKdBEp…1Kyx2881
r95SPPA…8D7c561
rGQqHaS…Fy5C1.1K1
rhYtqzC…NYjc2.0K1
rwVQrMU…T4gX1831
rKPzJp2…z3We2.5K1
r93GM5K…kHvM4321
rHHHp9S…XZXZ1.3K1
rNBNH5o…Q194721
rBbQS3S…n9RU1011
rQMygc7…A2j76021
rNWX3vX…dhvh16.6K1
rLdjcpD…i98M1.3K1
rNt1ZKN…ZEyc5.4K1
rUiWEyE…ziEx3601
rGx244V…8fp51101
rEjYtr8…DWLX1111
rMo28w9…aoMA5001
rGywRaM…sUus551
rLFVmcD…EWhi1.7K1
rfZJAkM…jdT31.2K1
rsMJzot…cevy5.9K1
rJERX2v…XpNm4281
rfpSewC…QutJ5.7K1
r3StYsH…zrFm3.0K1
rK99Xgo…UpCo7.8K1
rLXE9uN…hmCB1301
rHkLdeD…dQBq19.5K1
rsa5xuD…8bWK5001
rL2e8mu…HMGY2.1K1
r9Ax2y9…3YNP6.6K1
rUU1pbC…9ZgR2.8K1
rfiRurM…37Af1.0K1
rDpQmEE…jRs32.2K1
rJUBQks…UH5T2.2K1
r4oATgh…QwEk3021
rHmrKiN…jbLu4231
rsVUdJj…zKmm2.1K1
rpvYTNf…Awz63451
rPddhu8…hcSA5.5K1
rJ5fPqq…u5zW20.7K1
rJ6mmfF…SGuz1.0K1
rKm2jYA…F6Yh1.0K1
r4j1Ptr…rSrZ2.8K1
rhD5oaP…WKEg1.1K1
ra1bTax…11e83241
rDXpPGS…LgRL2.0K1
rDebhMZ…Gt9Q2.4K1
rpvfwBq…t1tR511
rnquwgB…v1bH4231
rEGbkzr…cEhZ801
rKJAX9Z…JpGt15.0K1
rNYcNV6…dG493951
rm5HHuR…MWrU1.0K1
rKjBAGk…RGLV1.6K1
rPd7Saq…e3Gc3051
rPT19jz…LqUi9221
rMQW6Ez…Tu8i1.7K1
rKzVQaP…EN5x1631
rGwCPYc…TR7x9341
rhZPXNr…cnz42881
r9qJd6Q…Ei3613.0K1
rpX5AC2…Vj1n1451
rPCqain…zkXw3.3K1
rpikSXc…CykF4.1K1
rsfeN8k…JbBQ1431
rGZ8Gmz…puJF4091
rQNroQQ…jT5V2.8K1
rJdTvuz…eXEV3071
rH1WQED…EYLh1.6K1
rJJt2iX…YYBs01
r9BKZmS…SHst2691
rGnAAsi…ZTk51.7K1
rJqtcEn…4jty1.2K1
r4knxbX…QxWq3171
rsKEagx…sQKH9921
rNvvycN…ezSU5431
rKQb14d…qub41.1K1
rh6q4gF…hWm2170.9K1
rB1wg1x…dfJQ154.1K1
rDeHs9d…XcKU1571
r4kkkcE…rQnm1121
raw5dGe…kFHh2151
rPXUpUs…sNP22.0K1
rMY1D82…AKx61.3K1
rUG7KjA…9GZB01
rHigdhZ…xDAn991
rPm4ECf…EEiV3281
rH6oM9Q…gaPj96.0K1
rsYWFH9…KNFE551
rNeZcAh…QU4q1631
rhMsLPb…Yqjo3101
rNYcxiS…iMzd1.5K1
rD2892y…eyTq1.0K1
rGjE9mf…DEd62251
rDAeYwW…fpng1.7K1
rD6chto…9r5z3.3K1
rxwpC3U…psw65701
r9eKXfh…ZC2S2421
r4Az2BE…mmRh37.9K1
rpdjrXX…rrdr1.8K1
r4z4nhF…suwn901

Token sweeps

The drain isn’t XRP-only — it sweeps whatever the victim holds. Confirmed token sweeps:

TokenAmount sweptDrains
XRPH23.21M2024
RLUSD3502023
XRPHAI2.43M199
USDT3111
HBAR7.85M1
CSC43.8K1
BEAR13.6K1
BAYNANA5.0K1
xPizza121
PHNIX645.1K1
DROP31
ARK18.2K1

What gets flagged

Confirmed drainer wallets are added to a free, verified blocklist that wallets and marketplaces consume. We flag only the attacker’s receiving wallet — a victim who was tricked into signing is never listed.

Free API — block the drainers

No key required. The list is the union of every flagged XRPL address — payment drainers, NFT-phishing scam issuers, and other known scam wallets — so a single integration protects against all of them. Mirror it client-side and reject any Payment or offer to a flagged address before you sign.

1. Flat payment-side blocklist (union of all drainer + scam addresses)
curl https://api.xrpl.to/v1/scams/addresses
2. Check a single counterparty before signing
curl https://api.xrpl.to/v1/scams/check/rNVdQM2AupHsZfGfkHKR4qfPHcLYwwbmH3

Suggested integration: on app load, fetch /v1/scams/addresses once and cache the scamAddressesList; before submitting any Payment or accepting any offer, reject if the counterparty is in the set.

Data is on-chain and updates live as new drains are detected. Snapshot generated 0s ago. This page is informational; it is not financial or legal advice.